BE COOL! STAYING OPEN MINDED ABOUT
CLIMATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT
SCOTT H. SEGAL †
In the competition for the limited attention span that the
American polity devotes to environmental issues, there can be no
1
doubt that global climate change is in a category by itself.
Regardless of relative position on the political spectrum, the
American public and its leaders have come to agree on once
controversial elements of the climate narrative. Discussion of the
greenhouse effect and its implications were once the boutique
musings of environmental policy wonks. No longer. A major motion
2
3
4
picture, an Academy Award, a Nobel Prize, not to mention
frequent appearances throughout the popular culture, have elevated
climate change to celebrity status.

† The author is a partner and co-head of the government relations and strategy section at
the law firm of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP. JD, University of Texas – Austin; BA – Emory
University. Mr. Segal previously taught environmental law and policy development at the
University of Maryland (University College). He is indebted to the entire Bracewell team
working on climate change policy, including Jeff Holmstead, Dee Martin, Josh Zive, Lisa
Jaeger, Ed Krenik, Rich Alonso and Mike McNerny.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2007) (discussing public opinion regarding climate change). While Sunstein
cites survey data showing that the American public opinion does not support drastic action on
climate change or any environmental topic for that matter, he does concede that media
attention on climate change and its symbols has been gaining momentum throughout the 1990s.
Id.
2. An Inconvenient Truth (Paramount Pictures 2006). Actually, two motion pictures, if
you count The Day After Tomorrow (20th Century Fox Studios 2004).
3. The Oscars, Winner: Documentary Feature, http://www.oscar.com/oscarnight/winners/
?pn=detail&nominee=AnInconvenientTruthDocumentaryFeatureNominee (last visited Feb.
24, 2007). Former Vice President Albert V. Gore offered the following remarks on accepting
the Academy Award, “Thank you. I want to thank Tipper and my family, thank the Academy
and everyone on this amazing team. My fellow Americans, people all over the world, we need
to solve the climate crisis. It’s not a political issue, it’s a moral issue. We have everything we
need to get started, with the possible exception of the will to act, that’s a renewable resource.
Let’s renew it.” Id.
4. Vice President Gore received a share of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work on
global climate change. His acceptance speech can be viewed and read on his blog posting, I Am
Deeply Honored, AL GORE, Oct. 12, 2007, http://blog.algore.com/2007/10/i_am_deeply_
honored.html.
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Now that an emerged consensus advocating action forms the
basis of the climate discussion, we need only discuss a principled basis
for deciding among proposed policy solutions to address the problem.
As Mencken remarked, however, complex problems often have
5
solutions that are “neat, plausible and wrong.” Unfortunately, given
the proven and purported environmental and economic impacts
associated with climate policy, the consequences of being wrong are
significant. Policy makers are well advised to be at least as careful in
joining in any policy consensus as they were in accepting a scientific
one.
This essay will examine briefly the common ground of the
emerged political consensus to take action on climate change. Then,
we will briefly review the current options to address climate change—
with a particular emphasis on exploring incentives-based concepts.
Next, the essay will address the downside consequences of an
improperly calibrated climate change policy. And last, we will
conclude with upsides—environmental, energy and economic—of
properly addressing the opportunity presented by innovative climate
change policy.
I. THE EMERGED CONSENSUS
Not long ago, the climate narrative was dominated by the story
that climatic history could be divided into glacial and interglacial
6
periods—ice ages and temperate ages. The notion was that Earth
was nearing the end of its current interglacial period—the one
responsible for the development of current human culture. A
combination of anthropogenic emissions and activities were hastening
the arrival of the next ice age. Concerted international action was
needed; at the very least, reexamination of the primacy of economic
7
growth was in order.
Since that time, the climate narrative has changed. The
consensus view, as expressed by the United Nation’s
5. H.L. Mencken’s full remark is, “There’s always an easy solution to every human
problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.” H.W. LEWIS, TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 48 (1990) (citing
H.L. Mencken).
6. David S. Chapman & Michael G. Davis, Global Warming— More Than Hot Air?, 27 J.
LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 59, 59-60 (2007). For a general discussion of climactic periods,
see id. at 59-77.
7. See, e.g., LOWELL PONTE, THE COOLING (1976) (quoting climatologist Stephen
Schneider on the back cover as stating that this “well-written book” hypothesizing global
cooling may support the notion that “massive world-wide actions to hedge against that threat
deserve immediate consideration”).
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and others, is
that the Earth is in the grips of a warming trend, or a perceptible
increase in the average mean temperature of the atmosphere. As far
9
as the science goes, “the debate on global warming is over.” Indeed,
one study has found that three quarters of all climate studies support
the essential principles that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases (GHGs) are increasing, that warming is occurring, and that
10
human activity plays a contributing role. Questions regarding the
rate of change and the extent to which controls on emissions will help
still exist.
But, unsurprisingly, most agree that concerted
international action is needed; at the very least, reexamination of the
11
primacy of economic growth is in order.
There is as much hubris in stating that climate science is perfect
as there is in stating that it is without merit. It is perhaps most useful
to simply say that climate science is robust enough to support the
political consensus for action. As a corollary, it is no longer useful to
lodge purely scientific arguments as the basis to reject the adoption of
proposals designed to reverse or at least ameliorate the consequences
of climate change. As Professor Richard Pierce has written, “I now
rate the probability that the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis
is true at around 90%. . . . It is time to shift most of the public debate
from whether anthropogenic global warming is real to what we should
12
do about it.”
There is a central irony behind the recently emerged political
consensus: for all the blood, sweat and intellectual tears spilled in the
climate debate, was it needed after all? Scholarship and commentary
on climate change has come to the fore in roughly the same time

8. Elisabeth Rosenthal & James Kanter, Alarming UN Report on Climate Change Too
Rosy, Many Say, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 18, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/
11/18/europe/climate.php?page=2 (stating that “most scientists have been awed by the IPCC’s
deliberate work”).
9. Gary Stix, A Climate Repair Manual, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 46.
10. Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,
Science, Dec. 2004, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/306/5702/1686 (writing that 75
percent of the 928 abstracts listed in the Institute of Scientific Information between 1993 and
2003 that contained “climate change” as a key word either explicitly or implicitly endorsed the
consensus viewpoint); see also Daniel J. Grimm, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A
Proposed Model for Allocating Tort Damages among C02 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
209, 212 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral Frame for
Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577, 587-89 (2007).
12. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595,
597 (2007).
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frame as scholarship and commentary on the diminishing supplies of
13
key fossil fuels and the security risks presented by continuing
14
reliance on foreign sources of supply. All of these trends counsel
policy makers to take the same course: diversify our sources of energy
15
In any event, these simultaneous
and deploy new technologies.
strands of public argument seem to be largely mutually reinforcing—
at least on the need for action.
II. OPTIONS CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE
16

A quick screening of the film An Inconvenient Truth yields
another truth: the vast majority of the film dwells on the science and
consequences of climate change. Very little of the film dwells on
solutions, save cursory statements that flash during the closing
17
credits.
In that sense, the award-winning film is a reasonable
facsimile of the actual state of policy analysis. With the seeming
acquiescence of the press, much of the climate discourse in the
current Presidential campaign has focused on general statements on
the issue; little attention has been paid to the nuances of the policy
18
options.

13. See, e.g., M. King Hubbert, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels Mar. 7-9 1956,
http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf. Scholarship regarding the “peak oil”
hypothesis has been gathering currency roughly since the work of M. King Hubbert in the mid1950s. The peak theory posits that there exists a rough bell curve in the amount of available
crude petroleum and natural gas reserves, and that current production is on the downside of
that curve. For recent support, see John Donnelly, Price Rise and New Deep-water Technology
Opened Up Offshore Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2005, at A36 (quoting an ExxonMobil
exploration official, who stated, “All the easy oil and gas in the world has pretty much been
found”). The peak theory may be approaching consensus. See Russell Gold & Ann Davis, Oil
Officials See Limit Looming On Production, WALL STREET J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (“A
growing number of oil-industry chieftains are endorsing an idea long deemed fringe: The world
is approaching a practical limit to the number of barrels of crude oil that can be pumped every
day. Some predict that, despite the world’s fast-growing thirst for oil, producers could hit that
ceiling as soon as 2012.”).
14. See MILTON R. COPULOS, THE NAT’L DEF. COUNSEL FOUND., AMERICA’S ACHILLES
HEEL THE HIDDEN COSTS OF IMPORTED OIL 7 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ndcf.org/
(finding in part that “as long as America remains heavily dependent on imported crude, its
national security remains jeopardized”).
15. Id. at 108.
16. An Inconvenient Truth, supra, note 2.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., How Green Is Your Candidate? Interviews and info on the presidential
candidates’ environmental positions, GRIST, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.grist.org/feature/
2007/07/06/candidates/ (describing early Clinton campaign positions on climate as “vague about
solutions” and Obama campaign positions as “largely platitudinous on energy and climate” and
noting both have since become more detailed). Initially, the Presidential campaigns were
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There are a number of reasons why open and honest discussion
of public policy response has been so limited. Perhaps copy and
images related to policy just don’t touch the popular zeitgeist in the
same way as the symbolism of science, from floods to storms to polar
19
bears. Perhaps the adoption of policy is not without costs, and the
imposition of costs likely to be reflected in the price of energy may
well have regressive impacts on those in society least able to afford
20
Or perhaps developing credible and cost-effective policy
it.
21
acceptable to the public is just plain hard.
Despite the lack of truly definitive analysis, policy makers—
particularly those in Congress—seem most enamored with the
22
concept of an emissions cap coupled with a trading regime. Such an
largely symbolic in their discussion of climate change. Id. They were less than clear about
specific policy proposals, although each has since released more detailed proposals. Id. Despite
releasing more detailed plans, there has been little public discourse comparing these policies.
The media has not forced the issue in any meaningful way. See Kim Zetter, Al Gore makes
impassioned plea to TEDsters, WIRED.COM, Mar. 3, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/business/
2008/03/al-gore-makes-i.html (citing data gathered by former Vice President Al Gore on “the
number of questions that broadcast media outlets posed to presidential candidates last year
[2007] about the climate crisis”). NBC’s top journalists asked 956 questions of the candidates,
but only two of them were about the climate crisis. Id. ABC journalists asked 844 questions;
two of which were about the crisis. Id. Fox and CNN also asked two questions on the topic, and
CBS had “asked none.” Id. In a general sense, failure to discuss specific policy in detail should
come as no surprise given the “ebb and flow” of campaign rhetoric. See BRUCE BUCHANAN,
RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: CAMPAIGNS, MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 74
(1996) (noting that “‘politics as usual’ will always bid strongly to supplant issue campaigns” in
part because the personal and negative components of modern campaigns “usually marginalize
the issues discussion by reducing the attention issues get in the media, which is more attracted to
the ebbs and flows of political combat than to policy substance”).
19. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 46 (discussing the centrality of the need to associate climate
change with “a cognitively ‘available’ event [that] . . . might well lead to a substantial increase in
concern”).
20. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 881-82 (200506) (“[A]ny significant effort to curtail global warming would impose significant hardships,
especially on poor people, who are least able to bear the relevant cost increases.”).
21. See Daniel Yankelovich, How Public Opinion Really Works, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1992,
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1992/10/05/76926/index.htm
(“Wrestling with complex issues—abortion, the death penalty, immigration, censorship,
environmental protection, homelessness, as well as health care—requires getting in touch with
one’s deepest values and often realizing that these may conflict with one another on a particular
question. People naturally resist having to compromise or abandon cherished values.”).
22. The Impact of America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191) on the U.S. Economy
and on Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Envt. and Public
Works, 110th Cong. 5, (2008), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStore_id=132d40b2-ff1d-4dcc-a58d-022c80aa824d (statement of, Margot
Thorning, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Amer. Coun. for Capital
Formation) [hereinafter “Thorning Statement”]. Thorning claimed the proposition that success
of Acid Rain program and start of European trading program have caused many in Congress to
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approach would set a hard and declining limit on greenhouse gas
23
emissions from the principal emitting sectors in the economy. Those
reducing beyond the cap would generate credits that could be traded
24
to those that cannot quite meet the cap.
Doubtless, the greatest attraction of cap and trade regimes in the
climate change context is the generally accepted success of a cap and
25
trade program in reducing emissions that cause acid rain. This line
of analysis contends that all policy makers need do is “plus up” the
acid rain program adopted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 in order to produce a ready-made policy response to climate
change. Indeed, proponents of stringent caps even claim that because
some in industry opposed the acid rain program prior to 1990, and
because the program worked, such industry objections to GHG caps
26
should be viewed through a skeptical lens today.
Despite the great success of earlier trading programs, there is no
doubt that correctly calibrating a cap-and-trade program for GHG
emissions will be challenging. Yale economist William Nordhaus has
raised several specific obstacles to a well-functioning trading program
in the climate context, summarized as follows:
Such a program would require nations to make coordinated
decisions about emissions baselines that would be difficult or
impossible to make. It would create so much uncertainty about the
future prices of emissions permits that trade in permits would be
severely impaired. A global cap and trade system would also

express support for cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions. Id. (citing Ian W.H. Parry &
William A. Pizer, Emissions Trading Versus CO2 Taxes, WEATHERVANE, May 2007,
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/Backgrounders/RFF-BCK-TradingvsTaxes.pdf ).
23. Description of cap and trade programs proposed in the current Congress can be found
at Larry Parker & Brent D. Yacobucci, Greenhouse Gas Reduction: Cap-and-Trade Bills in the
110th Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. REPT. NO. RL33846, at 1 (Jan. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL33846.pdf (“In general, these proposals
would create market-based greenhouse gas reduction programs along the lines of the trading
provisions of the current acid rain reduction program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.”).
24. Id.
25. Zachary Coile, ‘Cap-and-Trade’ Model Eyed for Cutting Greenhouse Gases, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/
12/03/MNMMTJUS1.DTL.
26. Id. (noting proposals are based on 1990 Acid Rain program). However, comparisons to
the 1990 Acid Rain program can be highly problematic. See id. (“[A]ny effort to limit
greenhouse gases will be an order of magnitude bigger and more costly than the acid rain
program. While the acid rain initiative was focused on just one pollutant, sulfur dioxide
(nitrogen oxides were later added), the new proposals seek to limit carbon dioxide and five
other pollutants. The acid rain program focused on electricity producers, while the new efforts
would affect utilities, large manufacturers and the transportation sector as well.”).
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produce highly volatile energy prices and be characterized by
transactions costs so high they would impair its efficacy. Finally,
Nordhaus fears a global cap and trade system would be plagued by
27
pervasive corruption.

Despite any reservations in the literature, however, there can be
little doubt at this point that a trading program for GHG emissions
will at least be part of any solution. The architecture of such an
approach is familiar to both the regulated community and the public
interest community, as well as to government officials likely to
implement the program. That said, a “simmering debate” has
erupted over the use of carbon tax schemes as an alternative to
trading programs. Cap-and-trade policies “set an overall limit—
28
squeezed lower and lower over time—on the amount of” GHG
emissions, and then allow for trading. By contrast:
A carbon tax reverses the process. The government would impose
a tax on carbon output, gradually raising the price of energy
produced from fossil fuels to higher and higher levels. The cost of
coal would go up the most, because it emits more carbon dioxide
for each unit of energy, with the price rising less for products
derived from oil like gasoline and jet fuel, and even less for natural
gas. The money raised by the tax, ideally, would be used to offset
other taxes in ways that could compensate lower-income
29
households and minimize damage to the economy.

Many economists seem to believe that a carbon tax would be “a
30
superior policy alternative to an emissions-trading regime.” This is
because of the tax’s ability to enhance administrative effectiveness,
efficiency, the right-sizing of incentives, the minimization of
31
corruption, the relative ease of regulatory burden, and so on.
However, even as academic and policy discussion pitting trading
regimes against taxes has flourished, trading regimes continue in the
ascendancy, if for no other reason than the public’s aversion to tax
increases. This appears to be so, even if a trading regime behaves like

27. Pierce, supra note 12, at 600-601 (citing William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative
Measures to Control Global Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 31-34 (2006)).
28. Tom Redburn, The Real Climate Debate: to Cap or to Tax?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/us/politics/04web-redburn.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Kenneth P. Green, Stephen F. Hayward, and Kevin A. Hassett, Climate Change: Caps
v. Taxes, AMER. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL. RESEARCH, ENVT’L POLICY OUTLOOK, June 1,
2007, available at http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=26286.

314

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 18:307

a form of tax anyway, with the government collecting revenue from
32
auctioned credits and redistributing the funds as it sees fit.
While there is a healthy intellectual exchange on the pros and
cons of trading programs and carbon taxes, it appears that these are
the only principle tools under discussion. It has been suggested that
the use of modern environmental decision-making essentials could
yield no other result. Both a cap-and-trade program and a taxation
scheme, along with forerunner concepts of traditional command-andcontrol regulation, share in common the notion that interposition of
government will is a superior approach to the creation of positive
incentives to induce social change. Ted Nordhaus and Michael
Shellenberger have postulated that environmental thinkers have
trapped themselves in “the politics of limits” and are still searching
for ways to apply existing beliefs in innovation and entrepreneurship
33
to the desire for positive environmental outcomes.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger suggest that pollution control
strategies alone are insufficient to address as sweeping an
international problem as global climate change. Instead, society must
stand ready to implement the incentives of the marketplace as a
central feature of a comprehensive solution. They write:
[O]vercoming global warming demands something qualitatively
different from limiting our contamination of nature. It demands
unleashing human power, creating a new economy, and remaking
nature as we prepare for the future. And to accomplish all that, the
right models come not from raw sewage, acid rain, or the ozone
hole but instead from the very thing environmentalists have long
imagined to be the driver of pollution in the first place: economic
34
development.

Any approach to addressing climate change—no matter what the
balance of incentives to mandates—must encourage technological
innovation fit to the task of transforming society. One observer has
noted that, as it currently stands, there is “no magic Tylenol that will
cure this temperature rise overnight, because carbon dioxide can
32. Pierce, supra note 12, at 601 (“Many politicians and business leaders prefer a cap and
trade system to a carbon tax, but those preferences are based on dubious reasoning. Many
politicians prefer cap and trade because it allows them to avoid the dreaded ‘t’ word. They
either do not realize, or prefer to ignore, the reality that cap and trade imposes a ‘tax’ that is
functionally identical to a carbon tax. Either mechanism can be effective only by increasing the
price of carbon-dioxide emitting activities by the same large amount.”).
33. TED NORDHAUS AND MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 31-40 (Houghton Mifflin
2007).
34. Id. at 113.
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35

persist in the atmosphere for up to a few centuries.” This, of course,
is the central flaw in the products of prior international efforts to
address climate change. Left unaddressed at Kyoto was the notion
that climate change requires “an energy technology revolution on a
global scale” that would facilitate significant reductions in GHG
36
emissions at “acceptable costs.”
Available experience from
international efforts to regulate ozone-depleting substances further
underscores the point: it was only at the point that practical
technological alternatives were clearly on the horizon that an
international
treaty
limiting
chlorofluorocarbons
became
37
acceptable. As we shall see, proceeding with a regulatory regime
before technology is reasonably available is fraught with
complications.
III. THE PROBLEM OF “CHOOSING POORLY”
38

In the film classic Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, the
villain must choose among various options to identify the Holy Grail.
Tantalized by the shiny, jeweled choice, he turns to dust. An aging
39
knight, observing the mess, states wryly, “He chose . . . poorly.”
Given what’s at stake in the context of global climate change policy,
we had better hope for a more salubrious outcome.
The
consequences of “choosing poorly” are potentially adverse for the
environment, the economy, and even public health.
A. Environmental Consequences
In evaluating the environmental consequences of poorly
calibrated regulatory schemes to reduce GHG emissions, we must
begin by asking what is to be gained if the scheme performs as hoped.
Even if the Kyoto Protocol had performed as hoped, climate models
indicate that the mechanism may have only delayed the onset of
global warming by seven days by the end of this century. Even

35. Wood, supra note 11, at 581.
36. Richard E. Benedick, Avoiding Gridlock on Climate Change, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 9, 2007, available at http://www.issues.org/23.2/p_benedick.html.
37. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 63-64 (“[T]echnological innovation is highly desirable as a
means of reducing the costs of regulation [of greenhouse gases].”). Indeed, Sunstein contends
based upon experience with ozone-depleting substances, that “[t]echnological innovation led
the world to believe it had less to lose from regulation than it originally feared.” Id. at 34.
38. Jeff Boam, Screenplay to “Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade” (Paramount Pictures
1989), available at http://www.scifiscripts.com/scripts/Indiana3.txt.
39. Id.
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assuming the United States and Australia had signed on ab initio,
effects would only be postponed by five years by the end of this
40
century. Put another way, the consequences of global warming will
41
continue “even if we stop emitting all greenhouse gases tomorrow.”
The importance of these observations is not that they counsel
policymakers to do nothing; rather, they suggest that no climate
42
policy can be expected to gain the benefits of reversing climate
change in any complete sense, and that such policies are more
43
defensible if they can be embraced on a “no-regrets” basis. A noregrets policy yields energy, security or environmental benefits, even
if climate benefits ultimately prove dubious.
One reason that U.S. climate policy might fail to produce the
desired environmental effect is that unilateral action on the part of
the United States does not guarantee the participation of developing
44
In particular, China’s
nations, including China and India.
45
extraordinary rate of industrialization over the last few decades has
46
made its emissions particularly problematic.
By some estimates,
China has already overtaken the United States in GHG emissions,

40. Bjorn Lomborg, Chill Out: Stop Fighting Over Global Warming—Here’s the Smart Way
to Attack It, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2007, at B1.
41. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 13. See also Sunstein, supra note 1,
at 33 (describing “meager effect” of Kyoto Protocol in “reducing anticipated warming”);
Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 72 (stating that even stabilization requires halving
emissions).
42. A possible exception to this statement would be the adoption of geoengineering
proposals, including iron fertilization, stratospheric sulfur injection, space-based mirrors, and
the like. However, “[n]one of these geoengineering solutions . . . is cost effective, and many
have other environmental drawbacks.” Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 71.
43. Joshua W. Busby, Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT NO. 32, Nov. 2007, at 11, available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ClimateChange_CSR32.pdf (calling on the
United States to “prioritize so-called no-regrets policies, those that it would not regret having
pursued even if the consequences of climate change prove less severe than feared”).
44. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 12 (“China and India long ago
rejected any approach to addressing climate change that would constrain their greenhouse gas
emissions or their economic growth.”).
45. Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dagon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement,
and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
267, 270 (2007) (noting the “runaway economic growth” growth of China that was four times the
growth rates of advanced economies during the 1990s).
46. Id. at 271 (noting that the EPA found that more than twenty-five percent of the
atmospheric pollution on the U.S. West Coast relates to Chinese production).
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and is on track to account for some forty percent of total global GHG
47
emissions by 2020.
The importance of China and other developing nations in
assessing the environmental consequences of U.S. policy cannot be
overstated. As Pierce has observed, “[a]ny effort that excludes major
nations would be an expensive exercise in futility. It would yield
more geographic redistributions of emissions than reductions in
48
emissions.” Sunstein notes that “[f]or the United States, unilateral
action to comply with the Kyoto Protocol may well produce no
49
Such redistribution of productive assets to
benefits at all . . . .”
China could make matters even worse for the environment, given the
50
comparative lack of institutional environmental controls.
Some have argued that the United States must lead by example,
51
potentially drawing recalcitrant nations along in its wake. While this
outcome is possible, so is its opposite. Unions for Jobs and the
Environment, a group of ten major U.S. labor organizations and a
non-governmental observer accredited by the United Nations
52
Framework Convention on Climate Change, has argued that if
environmental advocates “were to succeed in . . . forc[ing] unilateral
reductions in the US, without regard to foreign policy, the US would
lose an important source of foreign policy leverage; namely, the

47. Geraldine Tyrrell, Chinese Pollution Control Laws: Moving Towards Sustainable
Development?, 10 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 67, 69 (2007); see also Keith Bradsher, China to Pass
U.S. in 2009 in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at C1.
48. Pierce, supra note 12, at 600. See also Unions for Jobs and the Environment, Amicus
Brief at 7, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120),
[hereinafter UJAE Brief] (“GHG emissions from all sources in all nations contribute to an
undifferentiated worldwide concentration in the upper atmosphere . . . . Therefore, the potential
benefit of GHG emission reductions made in the US can be thwarted when emitters in other
nations increase or refuse to reduce their emissions.”).
49. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 34.
50. See Sitaraman, supra note 45, at 335 (citing China’s “lack of strong centralized
environmental administration” and its “deep-seated political unwillingness to disrupt economic
growth, combined with corruption and local protectionism” that prevents it from enforcing even
its own environmental standards).
51. See Andrew C. Revkin, As China Goes, so Goes Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2007, at 4.3 (quoting BinBin Jiang, a research associate in energy and development at Stanford
University, who stated, “‘China is clearly responsible for the largest wedge of emissions in the
future, but the United States is still the biggest roadblock. The U.S. is not going to be influential
by telling China what to do. It has to lead by example’”). See also Zachary Coile, Emissions
Bill Heads to Fight on Senate Floor, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2007 (citing U.S. Sen. John Warner,
stating, “If we don’t act, China and India will simply hide behind America’s skirts of inaction
and take no steps of their own”), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/12/06/ MNIBTP0QH.DTL&hw=boxer&sn=003&sc=787
52. UJAE Brief, supra note 48, at 1-2.
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ability to insist on commitments by other nations as a precondition
53
for its own GHG reductions.” The Supreme Court has recognized
this exact strategy, withholding unilateral action as leverage, as a
54
principled basis for preempting inconsistent state action. At oral
55
argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Alito raised the concern.
The policy challenge of addressing climate change in many parts
of the world includes not just emissions control but also adaptation to
the effects of climate change. Even assuming full compliance with
environmental controls in developing nations, there still may be
heightened impact associated with climate-related damages. A
massive investment overseas in regulatory programs could even have
the perverse effect of reducing resources available for needed climate
56
57
adaptation programs or disease prevention programs.
B. Economic Consequences
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), one of the principal
architects of climate change legislation currently pending before the
U.S. Senate, has been refreshingly candid about the impact of his
proposed legislation on certain sectors of the economy, noting that
the bill would cost “hundreds of billions” of dollars over the next few
58
decades.
Unfortunately, these compliance costs are not borne
equally across the U.S. economy. Those in society least able to afford
increased prices of energy and manufactured goods will be hurt the
most by poorly calibrated carbon caps. In particular, the elderly,

53. Id. at 26.
54. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000) (finding that
forbearance from domestic action constitutes foreign policy because without such forbearance
“the President has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage as a consequence”);
see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003).
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (2007) (Justice Alito references the “view that for the United States to proceed unilaterally
would make things worse and therefore they’re going to decline to regula[te] for that reason”),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1120.pdf.
56. Lomborg, supra note 40, at B1 (“If we focus instead on environmental concerns and,
for instance, adopt the hefty cuts in carbon emissions many environmental groups promote, this
could reduce the rise by about five inches. But cutting emissions comes at a cost: Everybody
would be poorer in 2100. With less money around to protect land from the sea, cutting carbon
emissions would mean that more dry land would be lost, especially in vulnerable regions such as
Micronesia, Tuvalu, Vietnam, Bangladesh and the Maldives.”).
57. Id. (“According to scientific models, implementing the Kyoto Protocol for the rest of
this century would reduce the malaria risk by just 0.2 percent. On the other hand, we could
spend $3 billion annually—2 percent of the protocol’s cost—on mosquito nets and medication
and cut malaria incidence almost in half within a decade.”).
58. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 5.
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those living on fixed incomes, and those living at or near the poverty
level have a greater proportion of their income dedicated to energyrelated expenses, rendering the impact of carbon caps potentially very
59
Even when cap-and-trade programs are designed to
regressive.
rebate some portion of proceeds to the poor, most of the cost of the
60
cap is still borne by consumers. This problem persists even when
creative mechanisms are employed to distribute carbon allowances.
The precise economic impacts that can be attributed to a climate
change policy vary greatly depending on the details of the legislation
and the assumptions made in the economic models employed. For
example, there has been no authoritative government analysis of the
economic impact of S.2191, legislation introduced by Senator
Lieberman and Senator John Warner (R-VA).
One analysis
conducted by Charles River Associates (CRA) has found that nearterm price increases related to the bill’s implementation “would be
61
disruptive to the economy, and cause a painful transition.” CRA
also found a potential increase of some 36 percent to 65 percent in
wholesale electricity prices alone, continuing to rise by 2050 to the
62
range of an 80 percent to 125 percent increase. The bottom line
economic assessment: U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) could be
lower in 2015 by about $160 billion to $250 billion. Eventually, found
CRA, the annual loss in GDP attributable to the Lieberman-Warner
63
legislation would increase to the range of $800 billion to $1 trillion.
Large-scale negative economic consequences, regressively borne
by American consumers, should give policy makers some pause. For
cost of this magnitude also creates the potential for a vicious cycle in
which economic consequences tamp down the potential of the
economy to stimulate technological innovation. As the National
Institute of Standards and Technology found, “the overall health of
59. Sunstein (2006), supra note 20, at 881; see also Scott Segal, Public Hearing Statement of
the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council, Mar. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.electricreliability.org/vc.php?cid=81 (“If regulations force utilities to shift from coal
to natural gas, the result is predictable. As Catholic Charities of Cleveland has testified that,
‘the conversion to natural gas from coal would have a devastating effect on the people of Ohio
and our country, particularly the poor and the elderly.’”).
59. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 6.
60. Id.
61. The Impact of America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191) on the U.S. Economy
and on Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Environment
and Public Works, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) (statement of Dr. Anne Smith) [hereinafter “Smith
Statement”].
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at 6.
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the U.S. economy will affect the pace of innovation across all
industries and technologies. A strong economy increases the pool of
capital available for the purchase of new technology and for
64
investment by companies in R&D.” Unfortunately, the potential for
carbon caps to penalize carbon-emitting technologies cannot be seen
as a reliable incentive for development of new, cleaner technology.
Because carbon caps have the potential to cause power generators
simply to switch fuels in the near term—say, from coal to more
expensive natural gas—the caps divert capital away from
technological innovation and into costly fuels. Margo Thorning
describes the result:
Caps on emissions are not likely to promote new technology
development because caps will force industry to divert resources to
near-term, “end of pipe” solutions rather than promote spending
for long-term technology innovations that will enable us to reduce
GHGs and increase energy efficiency. An emission trading system
will send exactly the wrong signals to investors because it will
65
create uncertainty about the return on new investment.

A loss of innovation is more than just a complication: the
development and deployment of new technology for the generation
of electricity, transportation, energy efficiency and emissions control
are essential prerequisites to addressing global climate change in any
66
meaningful way.
C. Energy Policy Consequences
There are certain immutable facts that any energy policy must
take into account for the United States. First, coal-fired electric
67
power represents over half of U.S. electric generating capacity. No
combination of demand-side management and renewable energy will
likely be able to replace any substantial portion of that capacity any
68
time in the near future. Second, policies designed to reduce GHGs

64. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DIVISION ON ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH
SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS, FUTURE R&D ENVIRONMENTS: A
REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 131 (2002).
65. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 6.
66. See Redburn, supra note 28; see also Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 9
(“Technology development and deployment offers the most efficient and effective way to
reduce GHG emissions and a strong economy tends to pull through capital investment faster.”).
67. H. Sterling Burnett, Coal Power in the Black, Texas Public Policy Foundation
Commentary, Dec. 7, 2006, http://www.texaspolicy.com/commentaries_single.php?report_id=
1236.
68. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2
Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 485 (2007) (“Coal is essential to
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through inflexible regulatory or tax mechanisms can result in
significant fuel-switching away from coal to natural gas or other more
69
expensive energy sources. Removing coal from the energy mix can
directly undermine the reliability and affordability of electricity for
70
consumers and businesses.
One study conducted by researchers at Pennsylvania State
University (PSU) has attempted to estimate the rough economic
benefits of maintaining coal as a viable part of the fuel diversity of the
71
United States. The PSU team assumed a replacement of coal-fired
capacity with more costly alternatives, such as natural gas and a ten
percent renewables mix. Even when the positive impacts of
investment in gas and renewables is netted out, the study found that
by 2015:
• The annual benefit of coal use at currently projected levels is
estimated at more than $1 trillion in gross domestic product
(GDP), $360 billion in additional household income and
nearly 7 million jobs.
• In contrast, a 33 percent reduction in coal-fired electric
power generation would reduce GDP by $166 billion,
household income by $64 billion and employment by 1.2
million below what it otherwise would be.

foreseeable energy production, and there are no viable substitutes readily available.”); Burnett,
supra note 67 (“Coal is a secure energy source, since the United States contains more than a
quarter of the world’s recoverable reserves, equaling a 250-year supply at current rates of
consumption. As a result, coal-fired power plants generate 52 percent of the electricity in the
United States.”).
69. See EUGENE M. TRISKO, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO.
573, ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF COAL-BASED ENERGY 1 (2006), available
at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba573/ba573.pdf (“[D]omestic and international proposals to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions would force utilities to shift electricity production from coal to
other sources of generation. For example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the
U.S. Department of Energy estimated the climate change plan proposed by Sen. John McCain
(R-Ariz.) and Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) in 2004 would reduce coal use by 59 percent to
78 percent.”); Burnett, supra note 67 (“[P]roposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would
force utilities to shift electricity production from coal to other sources of generation.”).
70. See BERNARD L. WEINSTEIN AND TERRY L. CLOWER, OUR ENERGY FUTURE: THE
NEED TO EXPAND AND DIVERSIFY TEXAS POWER GENERATION 6 (2007), available at
http://www.unt.edu/cedr/PowerDiversification.pdf (demonstrating that “fuel diversity . . . [in]
generation mix” is necessary to maintain “affordable and reliable electricity to households and
business in the years ahead” but noting that in the near term, “base-load coal plants offer the
best opportunity to achieve diversification while ensuring reliability and affordability”).
71. TRISKO, supra note 69, at 1.
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•

A 66 percent reduction in coal-fired electric power
generation would reduce GDP by $371 billion, household
72
income by $142 billion and employment by 2.7 million.
The negative impacts discussed in the PSU study were not limited to
any one particular region of the United States.
D. Public Health Consequences
There are ways, of course, in which improved energy efficiency
73
itself can result in unintended consequences for public health.
However, to the extent society has already chosen a course to
encourage efficiency, these health end-points are either deemed
reasonable in pursuit of broader public policy goals or are themselves
addressed by other policy choices. Of greater interest here are health
end-points that are exacerbated by the choice of climate policy
options that could otherwise be avoided by choosing a more
sensitively calibrated option.
One endpoint of concern again relates to potential
macroeconomic impacts associated with significant fuel switching. In
1979 and 1984, the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress
authorized research by Dr. M. Harvey Brenner at the Johns Hopkins
University to demonstrate the relationship between unemployment
74
That work yielded a strong correlation,
rates and public health.
showing that each one percent increase in the unemployment rate
75
In 2005,
resulted in a two percent increase in premature death.
Brenner updated his work. The Brenner econometric model, applied
to economic conditions likely to result from fuel-switching and based
upon over 50 years of U.S. health and economic data, yielded
significant results.
Specifically, he found that “the estimated
72. Id.
73. It has been argued that increased efficiency for automobiles may decrease the vehicle
size, thus making occupants for susceptible to injury or death in the event of accidents. See, e.g.,
Thomas Gale Moore, The Unresolved Conflict Between Auto Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 1 J. OF
REG. & SOC. COSTS 71, 72 (1990). Making your home more energy efficient can trap pollutants
inside that can be 100 times higher than ambient air pollution. See, e.g., Morris Carey, Indoor
Pollution Just as Damaging, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=129918.
74. See M. HARVEY BRENNER, JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., ESTIMATING THE
SOCIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
HEALTH AND CRIMINAL AGGRESSION (1979); see also M. HARVEY BRENNER, JOINT ECON.
COMM., 98TH CONG., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON NATIONAL
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING (1984).
75. See BRENNER, ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY,
supra note 74.
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additional mortality in the year 2010, based on four different
variations of the model, ranges from an additional 170,507 to 368,915
deaths for the displacement of 100% of coal-based generation. The
author’s moderately conservative estimate is based on an annual
76
change model at 195,308 deaths” Admittedly, the high end of these
77
mortality projections assumes rather substantial fuel-switching.
Utilizing the more conservative Energy Information Administration
data taken from an earlier analysis of pending climate legislation
resulted in the following conclusion:
Given an estimated potential displacement of 78% of U.S. coal
generation based on EIA’s study of proposed climate change
initiatives, the indicated premature mortality from reduced income
and increased unemployment would exceed 150,000 deaths
78
annually, absent direct and effective mitigation programs.

Regardless of where on the spectrum mortality associated with
the economic dislocation resulting from climate change policy may
fall, policy makers should still endeavor to minimize these impacts—
particularly if constructive and effective climate policy still results.
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY
The way to address the challenge of global climate change is by
no means to passively adopt a business-as-usual position. “There is
an alternate path,” write geophysicists David Chapman and Michael
Davis. “We could unleash our engineering, economic, and political
entrepreneurs to improve energy conservation and efficiency and
79
move us towards greater use of renewable energy sources.” The
question, of course, is how.
With a political consensus already hardening around trading
regimes, it would be foolish not to learn all we can about how to
appropriately structure such programs. However, if we are relying on
innovation and new technology to eventually provide solutions, it is
also wise to ask what combination of policies—and in what order—
maximizes the potential return on our policy investment. There is no
doubt that the encouragement of new technological development is a
critical element in convincing the developing world to adopt new
ways of doing things.
Our experience with ozone-depleting
substances showed that a critical mass of support for an international
76.
77.
78.
79.

See TRISKO, supra note 69, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 59.
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regime was achieved only after technological innovation had
80
Ultimately, the development and
produced tangible results.
diffusion of new technology could even allow developing nations to
“skip the carbon intensive, energy-production stage of
81
industrialization.”
While the time developing a cap-and-trade program is potentially
well spent, it makes sense to first focus on the basket of policy options
that might constitute an incentives-based approach to climate change
policy. Former Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), in recent debate
with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) over global climate change policy,
put it this way: “the morning you provide the incentives, it’ll be 50,000
entrepreneurs figuring out how to get the money. The morning you
try to do it by regulation, there’ll be 50,000 entrepreneurs hiring a
82
lawyer to fight you. It’s a fundamentally different model.”
The “fundamentally different model” must take into account the
fact that carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions are unlike other
pollutants we have faced in the past. The range of activities,
economic sectors, lack of ready alternatives, and other factors dictate
83
not a “go-slow” approach, but perhaps a “go-different” approach.
An incentives-based policy initiative might contain the following
measures:
i.
An accurate assessment of GHG emissions in the form of a
registry modeled on the best aspects of current state and
federal reporting programs;
ii. A set of reasonable milestones for GHG emission
reductions that place the United States on a glide path of
stabilization;

80. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 34 (“We might find a parallel to the process that led to the
Montreal Protocol, as technological innovation led the world to believe that it had less to lose
from regulation than it originally feared.”).
81. Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 59.
82. Senator John Kerry & Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Debate at the NYU
Brademas Center for the Study of Congress: Global Climate Change and the Environment 15
(April
10,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/KerryGingrich_Federal_News_Service_transcript.pdf (transcript).
83. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (denied Sept. 8, 2003) (“It is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area
having greater ‘economic and political significance’ than regulation of activities that might lead
to global climate change. Virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is either directly or
indirectly a source of GHG emissions. . . . The production and use of fossil fuel-based energy
undergirds almost every aspect of the U.S. economy.”); Wood, supra note 11, at 585
(“Transitioning to a carbon-free society is more complicated than our previous experience with
CFCs because it involves nearly every sector of society.”).
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iii. The development of a tax incentive policy or policies to
encourage the use of, and investment in, near-term
technologies that are reasonably available;
iv. The development of loan guarantees to encourage the use of
and investment in longer-term technologies that are not
currently off-the-shelf;
v. The development of public-private partnerships with
dedicated funding sources to encourage more basic research
in areas critical to addressing the climate challenge;
vi. The development of policies to enhance the diffusion of new
technologies to markets in the developing world;
vii. Periodic program evaluation designed to monitor the extent
to which incentives are creating the basis for substantial
progress towards the achievement of GHG emission
reduction goals; and
viii. The development of a regulatory alternative—a cap-andtrade program with adequate cost containment—to phase
in, in the event that incentives do not produce the requisite
forward momentum.
The last suggested step is indicative of the notion that incentivesbased policies and regulatory policies are not inherently inconsistent,
provided that they are appropriately phased. No policy maker would
willingly run the gauntlet of economic consequences described in this
essay if an incentives policy could place the country on a glide path to
successful emissions reductions first. While sources of revenue will be
needed for an incentives-based policy, directly targeting the
encouragement of technology may be far more cost-effective than
adopting a cap first and merely hoping for innovation instead of fuelswitching. Even if the United States and other nations committed
0.05 percent of their respective GDPs to investments and incentives
for new technology—from new generation to capturing carbon—it
would amount to a ten-fold increase in global research and
84
And it would be some seven times cheaper than
development.
85
attempting to fully implement the Kyoto Protocol.
Tax incentives, loan guarantees, bonds, and other strategic
government investments, in partnership with private sector actors,
can awaken new technological possibilities and can accelerate gains in

84. Lomborg, supra note 40, at B1.
85. Id.
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86

energy efficiency and emissions control. Already, policy makers are
focusing on concepts like these in order to minimize the consequences
of proscriptive regulation described here, while truly addressing
climate change.
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) recently delivered the
keynote address at a meeting of the National Commission on Energy
Policy. He noted that a bipartisan group of Senators was working on
a proposal “to encourage the development of new technologies” by
use of appropriate tax treatment for companies that develop new
technologies, loan guarantees, and international technology transfer
87
reform. At the same meeting, the Democratic staff director of the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee agreed that capand-trade legislation may stall for political reasons, thus providing an
88
“ideal situation” for an incentives-based proposal.
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) recently announced a new
proposal that would set up the “Clean Energy Investment Bank of
the United States,” modeled on governmental financial institutions
such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the
89
The proposal would
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
provide “a variety of financing tools” to encourage investment in
renewable energy, carbon capture and sequestration, new nuclear
90
technology and other applications.
Perhaps not unlike climate science itself, creating incentives
packages properly calibrated to achieve environmental success is an
inexact science. The mechanism described in this essay or the two
proposals already under development seem like steps in the right
direction. While the total dollar amount needed is difficult to
estimate, one analysis has found that a domestic investment of $15 to
$30 billion a year in clean-energy research and development would
stabilize carbon emissions and would also foster appropriate market
dynamics that would allow the investments to pay for themselves

86. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 11-13.
87. Anthony Lacey, Voinovich Touts ‘Incentives’ As Bipartisan Alternative To Cap-AndTrade, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Jan. 24, 2008, http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/
ccn/show/voinovich_touts_ incentives_as_bipartisan_alternative_to_cap_and_trade/.
88. Id.
89. Ben Geman, Domenici Unveils Plans for Federal ‘Clean Energy’ Bank, ENV’T &
ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2008/03/03/5.
90. Id.
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91

thereafter.
Another estimate from the Electric Power Research
Institute finds that an investment of approximately $17 billion
between now and 2025 would be sufficient to undertake the steps
necessary to achieve near-zero emissions (SO2, NOx, mercury,
92
particulates, and CO2) from the use of coal.
Regardless of which roadmap is chosen, there is ample evidence
that a portfolio of public and private investments can target the actual
endpoints necessary to stabilize GHG emissions. Rather than
sacrificing considerable productive assets in the U.S. economy, a welldesigned incentive-based policy can “offer the promise of creating a
vibrant new industry capable of driving economic growth for decades
93
to come.” And if predictions such as these began a slow divergence
from reality, policy makers can always reserve the right to implement
a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not the intention of this essay to paint an unduly pessimistic
picture of the challenges ahead for climate change policy
development. First, as a society, we are already well along the path of
modifying behavior in order to react to a carbon-constrained world.
The United States arguably leads the world in reducing the energy
intensity of its economy, meaning that less energy is being consumed
94
for each unit of production. U.S. consumers are purchasing record

91. See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 124; see also Daniel Kammen,
The Rise of Renewable Energy, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 92 (discussing an analysis produced by
the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory University of California at Berkeley).
92. COAL UTILIZATION RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE CURC-EPRI ROADMAP: CLEANER,
AFFORDABLE, MORE EFFICIENT ENERGY FROM COAL 2 (Nov. 2007), http://www.coal.org/
UserFiles/File/Roadmap_-_November_2007.pdf (“With successful technology development and
increased federal funding, new coal-based power generation technologies can be demonstrated
by 2025 that control emissions, including CO2, while generating electricity at a cost no greater
than today’s modern power plants that are not equipped with CO2 controls.”).
93. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 124.
94. Steven F. Hayward, The United States and the Environment: Laggard or Leader?, AEI
ENVTL. POL’Y OUTLOOK, No. 1, Feb. 2008, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/
pubID.27548/pub_detail.asp (“The consistent improvement in America’s energy efficiency is an
untold and underappreciated long-term story. . . . In fact, some evidence suggests the United
States is currently outperforming Europe in reducing energy intensity (the amount of energy
used per unit of economic output) and greenhouse gases. According to the Department of
Energy’s latest annual report on the subject, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions fell by 1.5 percent in
2006, the first time they have fallen in a nonrecessionary year. It is likely that the United States
is the only industrialized nation whose greenhouse gas emissions fell in 2006.”).
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95

numbers of hybrid vehicles , energy-efficient appliances, and
96
insulation . Second, this essay does not reject the use of regulatory
approaches, trading regimes or carbon taxes. Rather, it recognizes
these policy options as part of a complex puzzle. Regulatory
approaches should not be undertaken lightly, must be calibrated to
avoid the worst predictable consequences, and perhaps should be
phased so that incentives-based policies can be tested first. Last, and
most importantly, the basis of the American economy and the quality
of life dependent upon it are closely tied to the entrepreneurial spirit
and innovation of market participants. This essay posits that it is
precisely those traits that can recognize global climate change as an
opportunity for the opening of new markets for technology in the
areas of energy efficiency, electric generation, and emissions control.

95. Daniel Gross, Blue-Collar Prius, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/131373 (citing Toyota data, “In 2007, a year in which overall
vehicle sales fell, hybrid sales rose 44 percent to constitute about 10.6 percent of sales.”); Hybrid
Sales Continue To Climb In United States, WEEKLY DRIVER NEWS SERV., Apr. 8, 2008,
available at http://theweeklydriver.com/articles/715/1/Hybrid-Sales-Continue-To-Climb-InUnited-States/Page1.html (“According to a report by the Green Car Congress in Washington,
D.C., sales of hybrids in the U.S. rose 10 percent in March 2008 compared to 2007 sales in the
same month.”).
96. Over half of Americans currently say they purchase energy-efficient appliances and
insulation. Of those that do not engage in these behaviors, 42 percent indicate that they are
willing to try such behaviors. Porter Novelli and the Center of Excellence in Climate Change
Communication Research, George Mason University, What Are Americans Thinking and Doing
About Global Warming? Results of a National Household Survey (2008), available at
http://climatechange.gmu.edu/PN%20GMU%20Climate%20Change%20Report.pdf (see Table
2, number of respondents ranging from 10,099 to 11,758).

